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Abstract: 
This article examines the evidences of moral hazard in the risk taking behavior of 
the 500 banks in Central Europe, the Baltics and Balkan region. We test the 
evidences of moral hazard in empirical relationships between shareholders, bank 
managers and regulatory restraints. The results generally support the theoretical 
arguments, though we cannot find explicit evidences of moral hazard in risk taking 
behavior of the bank managers of the region. Our findings suggest that the capital 
requirements and regulatory concerns along with performance efficiency exhibit the 
strongest impact on the level of risk taking. 
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1 Introduction  
In this paper, we examine potential moral hazard problems in the risk 
taking behavior of the financial institutions. We refer to the theoretical 
framework of Jeitschko and Jeung (2005) to describe the incentives of the 
agents and to model their risk preferences. An empirical study is conducted 
to examine these theoretical standings. Based on the dataset of 500 banks 
located in 21 countries of the Central Europe, Baltic and Balkan region over 
the period of 2006-2014, we investigate if the evidences of moral hazard 
exist in empirical relationships between shareholders, bank managers, from 
regulatory restraints and ownership structure. Several regression models 
have been applied to identify and compare risk taking patterns and hereby 
to draw conclusions on the evidences of the moral hazard.  
Theoretical literature stresses the key role of asymmetric information in 
lending markets (Janda, 2011; Mejstřík et al., 2015). A majority of studies 
shows that asymmetric information and moral hazard problems can 
generate market failures such as inefficient provisioning, mispricing of risk 
and consequently incentivize institutions to take higher risks. The study of 
the classical principal–agent problem and the conflicts rising from 
managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure is widely 
investigated in the theory of the firm e.g. Jensen and Meckling, (1976), 
Laffont and Martimort (2001). However, the empirical evidences are 
largely divided across various geographies with different banking sector 
structures. For example, the impacts of domestic, foreign or state ownership 
on bank performance are studied by Berger et al. (2005), Iannotta et al. 
(2013). They found that the banks with a large share of state ownership are 
 3 
associated with inferior long term performance and greater risk taking. 
Similarly Dong et al. (2014) show that Chinese banks owned by the 
government tend to exhibit more risk taking strategies than those owned by 
private investors. Whereas for the Russian banks  (Fungáčová and Solanko, 
2009) and banks of the Central Eastern Europe (Distinguin et al., 2013), 
their findings show the opposite effect. The explanation is that state-owned 
banks may benefit from an implicit government guarantee.  
Moral hazard and adverse selection in financial markets could frequently 
derive from regulations and governmental intervention that result in 
perverse incentives. Acharya et al. (2015) analyze how the capital 
requirements can address moral hazard problems in banking associated risk 
shifting and managerial under-provision of effort in loan monitoring. A 
number of studies (Antzoulatos and Tsoumas, 2014; Cheng et al., 2016; De 
Caux et al., 2017; Janda, 2009; Mariathasan et al., 2014)  points to the 
evidences of moral hazard behavior of financial institutions in case of 
various forms of government support i.e. bailout, guarantees, deposit 
insurance, etc. They suggest that the governmental guarantees reduce the 
downside risk associated with financing decisions and thus incentivize the 
banks to assume risks they would not choose to bear without the expected 
government support. Duran and Lozano-Vivas (2012), Ngalawa et al. 
(2016) indicate further that generous deposit insurance schemes seem to 
incentivize risk shifting to the non-depository creditors. By comparing the 
different forms of the government support, Janda (2011) concludes that in 
some situations the credit guarantees and interest rate subsidies are 
beneficial for borrowers and lenders, e.g. in the Czech Republic they 
positively affect the export finance (Janda et al., 2013).  
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The moral hazard hypothesis and banking management incentives are 
empirically studied by Berger and DeYoung (1997). Their results show that 
decreases in bank capital ratios generally precede increases in non-
performing loans for banks. Evidently, poor capitalized banks may respond 
to moral hazard incentives by taking increased portfolio risks. Moreover, 
they suggest a positive relation between non-performing loans and cost 
efficiency. Similar results were found by Podpiera and Weill (2008) who 
examine the question of the causality between non-performing loans and 
cost efficiency whether either of these factors is the determinant of bank 
failures. Analyzing data of Czech banks between 1994 and 2005, their 
findings support the evidences of bad management practices as a bad 
management hypothesis, according to which deteriorations in cost 
efficiency precede increases in non-performing loans. On example of the 
Chinese banking industry, Zhang et al. (2016) investigated how non-
performing loans are related to moral hazard problems. They used a 
threshold value for the non-performing loans expecting that there is a 
potential threshold above which risk-taking of banks increases and the non-
performing loans worsen. The find the empirical evidences of moral hazard 
behavior among the banks with higher portion of problematic loans on the 
book.  
2 Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
Jeitschko and Jeung (2005) propose a theoretical framework that describes 
the risk preference of the agents in situation of various risk-return profiles. 
It is assumed that capital and deposits are given exogenously to the bank 
and the choice of risky assets is not influenced by leverage considerations. 
There are three main incentives that affect bank’s asset risk choice. The 
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first is of the bank manager who makes the risk decisions by assets 
allocation. He has a private interest in maximizing his benefits and by his 
choice the assets risk is impacted. The second is of the shareholders who 
want to maximize the bank’s equity value and influence the asset choice 
through corporate governance structures. And at last, that of the regulators 
who are interested in minimizing the cost of bank failures and use 
regulation provisioning to indirectly affect the asset choice (e.g. deposit 
insurance or government guarantees). Considering all three above 
incentives of agents in form of separate objective functions, the bank choice 
of the risk can be represented by the following maximization equation:  
α ∈ arg max{ ωV(αs) + βE(B(αm)) − ρOV (ar)} ;         ω, β, ρ ≥ 0 
 (1) 
The risk choice α  of the bank in the above function is determined by 
relative weights (ω, β, ρ ) put on the bank’s equity value (V), the expected 
value of private benefit of managers (E(B)) and regulatory restraint as 
option value of deposit insurance (OV). The preferred risk choices of 
shareholders, managers and given regulatory restraint are captured in 
α𝑠 , α𝑚, α𝑟 respectively. The option value (OV) of deposit insurance (or of 
guaranteeing the promised payment) is considered as a put option on the 
assets and treated as an expected loss to guarantor. The regulatory 
constraints obviously are not favored by the banks and are therefore 
expressed with a negative sign. The weight ω is placed on the value of the 
bank equity to capture the shareholders’ influence. The weight β put on the 
managerial private benefit and ρ is the weight placed on the option value as 
a regulatory restraint. Thus, the shareholder’s agency problems from the 
underpriced deposit insurance are expressed in ω and ρ , while β refers to 
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the agency problem associated with management. If there were no agency 
problem with management then the value of weights would be equal  ω = ρ 
and β = 0.  The shareholders will always prefer a risk factor  α𝑠 > 0  to 
maximize their profits. The deposit insurance provider preference would be  
α𝑟 = 0, unless the higher risk and higher return profile of the bank will 
require other optimum level α𝑟  ∈  [0,1]. The bank manager’s risk choice 
would be α𝑚 = 0, when the private benefits are decreasing proportionally 
(𝐵 ≤ 0) with reducing risk, otherwise a preference is given to  α𝑚  ∈  [0,1].  
The theoretical model allows us to derive main hypotheses, which we will 
test empirically using our data sample: a) if the evidences of moral hazard 
exist in empirical relationships between shareholders, bank managers, from 
regulatory restraints and ownership structure; b) if bank managers are 
induced to the incentives of taking excessive risks causing further 
deterioration in the financial state or even leading to its insolvency and thus 
supporting the evidences of moral hazard and rent-seeking behavior 
(Acharya et al. 2015). 
3 Data and Methodology  
Our data set consist of 500 financial institutions located in the 21 countries 
of Central Europe and the Baltic region. The financial data is obtained from 
the database BankScope and own calculations.  The unbalanced data 
sample is due to the partly not reported financial information for the entire 
period of 10 years over the period 2006-2014, mostly for the small size 
banks.  
Given that the nature of moral hazard problems does not allow direct 
observation, we will study their indirect impact which is reflected on 
microeconomic level in the performance ratios of banking institutions. In 
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our analysis, we apply and compare the results from several panel data 
regression models. In line with our hypothesis, first of all we test if the 
explanatory variables reveal moral hazard behavior of the agents from the 
theoretical model. Besides, we are interested in finding whether there are 
empirical evidences of risk-taking patterns existing that can be attributed to 
the rent-seeking behavior (Acharya et al., 2015).  Several regression models 
and two types of risk metrics are used with the double motivation, to 
analyze the hypotheses questions on one hand and as a robustness check of 
the results on the other.  
Model 1                          𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (2) 
Model 2                          log 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑛 log 𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3) 
Model 3                   𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4) 
Model 4                   log  𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖  + 𝛽log 𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (5) 
Model 1 equation (2) refers to the pooled cross sectioned ordinary least 
square (OLS) linear regression. In Model 2 equation (3) we apply similar 
OLS regression, where both independent and dependent variables are log-
transformed.  By introducing the natural logarithm in the regression model 
we extend our analysis to accommodate possible non-linearity patterns and 
to investigate the nonlinear dynamics in relations between the observed 
variables. Additionally, we consider panel-data with fixed-effects 
regression, as indicated by the Hausman test. Model 3 equation (4) is a 
panel data regression model with fixed effects and in Model 4 equation (5) 
extended with the log-transformed independent and dependent variables. In 
all models, 𝑥 is a vector of bank-specific variables (all of them are listed in 
Appendix 1),  𝑑  is assigned dummies in the models,  𝑖  represents the bank 
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and  𝑡  is a time period respectively. The countries profile effects and the 
time-invariant individual effect are captured in 𝑎𝑖 and the regular 
unobserved factor in 𝜀𝑖𝑡. The bank specific variables 𝑥 are lagged with one 
year period (t-1) to mitigate the endogeneity problems and because of the 
delayed effect of management reaction that is visible next year financial 
results. The correlation coefficients among all our variables were found not 
to exceed 0.50 (except between ROE and ROA). The dependent variable 𝑦 
refers to the risk taking behavior of the financial institutions and is 
represented by two ratios. The asset risk is captured in the non-performing 
loan ratio (NPL), which is a ratio of non–performing loans to total 
portfolio. The overall riskiness of the bank can be measured by the ratio of 
risk weighted assets to total assets (RWATA) that reflects the riskiness of 
the business model of the banks in regulatory formulating (Janda and 
Kravtsov, 2016).  The first ratio is suitable for more traditional banks, 
where lending constitutes the main source of risk, while RWA includes the 
exposure of the bank to all types of risks mentioned by the regulations 
(Tanda, 2015). In line with the theoretical framework, our explanatory 
variables 𝑥  reflect the incentives of the agents: the shareholders who 
maximize the equity value and profitability (return on equity); the bank 
manager’s efficiency and monitoring efforts (return on assets, non-interest 
income to gross income) and regulatory constraints reflected in the capital 
adequacy and leverage ratios. Two types of dummies capture the regulatory 
pressure and the governmental background of the banks in the dataset.  
The controllable variable total assets (TA) is taken in the form of natural 
logarithm to control for potential size effects and gains from diversification 
of business lines. Efficiency ratios are represented by return on assets 
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(ROA) and ratio of non-interest income to gross income (NITI). As a proxy 
of bank manager’s efficiency, they indicate the efforts in optimizing the 
resources of the bank. The deteriorations in cost efficiency precede 
increases in non-performing loans due to the bad management and less 
monitoring efforts (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Podpiera and Weill, 2008). 
The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) and leverage ratio (LR) address the 
restraints from regulatory requirements on solvency and capital, i.e. the 
regulatory pressure considerations (Teply and Vejdovec, 2012).  For a 
dummy variable “regulatory pressure” we apply the same approach as 
Matejašák et al. (2009). The dummy value “1” is assigned if the capital 
ratio of the bank is below the threshold level which is equal to the 
minimum regulatory requirement CAR (8%) plus one standard deviation of 
the bank’s own capital ratio. Otherwise, the dummy value is 0.  Although 
the choice of one standard deviation is somehow arbitrary, the rationale for 
using this measure is that banks build a buffer above the regulatory 
minimum for precautionary reasons and the amount of this buffer depends 
on the volatility of capital ratio.  Dummy variable “government ownership” 
takes the value 1 if the share of state ownership is higher than 50% and the 
opposite value = 0. It addresses the hypothetical incentives for the 
shareholders to assume higher risks if the potential governmental support is 
available (Cheng et al., 2016; Mariathasan et al., 2014; Ngalawa et al., 
2016).  
4 Results 
The estimation results of our Models 1-4 are shown in Appendix 1 together 
with the coefficients of the explanatory variables, robust p -values and the t 
-statistic for individual significance. The models with OLS and fixed effects 
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regression produce in general comparable results and in most instances 
exhibit similar vector of the regression coefficients. Our estimated 
coefficients have the signs that we expected and generally compatible with 
the theoretical arguments in the literature. Yet, the non-linearity patterns 
across the Models 1-4 cannot be explicitly observed for the most variables 
with significant coefficients. Since we cannot find clear empirical 
evidences, we reject the hypothesis that the increase in non-performing 
loans or risks in portfolio structure (RWATA) causes even more risky 
lending and potentially leading to further deterioration of the loan quality. 
As expected, the banks’ performance ROE was found to be statistically 
significant at a level of 5% in all Models 1-4 and negatively related to both 
risk indicators NPL and RWATA. That is in line with the theoretical 
framework which explains the shareholder’s motivation of maximizing the 
profit  and is consistent with the empirical results of Berger et al. (2005).  
The indicators of the bank manager’s efficiency (ROA, non-interest income 
to gross income) show a rather mixed picture and different signs in 
regression coefficients. Overall results are not statistically significant to 
support the moral hazard among bank managers. It can be explained by 
structural versatility in the business models and obviously different level of 
banking governance practices across the banks in our sample. The capital 
adequacy ratio CAR has a strong impact on the level of credit risk taken by 
the CEE banks contrary to the leverage ratio.  The coefficients of CAR are 
statistically significant (for risk indicator NPL) at a level of 5% in Models 
1-3 with the coefficients from -0.356 to -0.020. In general, these estimates 
imply that the banks adjust capital ratios and risk to desired levels, this is 
also confirmed in the empirical study by (Matejašák et al., 2009). The 
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negative sign of all coefficients are in line with logic of regulatory restraint 
in the theoretical model. This observation is further reiterated in our 
empirical evidences by the negative vector of coefficients of regulatory 
pressure which is represented by the dummy variable (REG).  Contrary to 
the findings of Berger et al. (2005), Dong et al. (2014), Iannotta et al. 
(2013), who suggest that the banks with a large share of state ownership are 
associated with inferior long term performance and greater risk taking, our 
results show a positive relation between government ownership and level of 
risk taking. For both risk indicators NPL and RWATA in Models 1-2, the 
dummy (GOV) has a negative sign and statistically significant coefficients. 
This fact can be justified by several factors: traditionally less risky business 
models of the state owned banks, different bank governance approach and 
less pressure from the investor side on the profit maximization. According 
to our empirical results, the size of the total assets of the bank has not 
significant impact on the risk profile (NPL) and portfolio risk structure 
(RWATA), i.e. the diversification and size effects do not play significant 
role.  
5 Conclusion 
This study focuses on the examination of the evidences of moral hazard in 
the risk taking behavior of the 500 banks in the Central Europe, Baltics and 
Balkan region. We test the evidences of moral hazard in empirical 
relationships between shareholders, bank managers and from the point of 
regulatory restraints and ownership structure. The results generally support 
the theoretical arguments, though we cannot find explicit proof of moral 
hazard in risk taking behavior of the bank managers of the banks in our 
dataset. By analyzing and comparing the non-linear relations among risk 
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variables in several regression models, we don’t find sufficient empirical 
evidences to support it. Therefore, we reject the moral hazard hypothesis 
that an increase in NPL or risks in portfolio structure (RWATA) raises 
riskier lending practices potentially causing even further deterioration of the 
loan quality. Our findings suggest that the capital requirements and 
regulatory restraints show the strongest impact on the risk taking proving 
the fact that the bank capital requirements play a prominent role in 
sustaining financial stability. The performance efficiency of the baking 
institutions also exhibits substantial statistical evidences and indicates 
strong impact on the level of risk taking. 
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 Appendix 1: The regression results  
  NPL RWA/TA 
 Variables 
Pooled OLS Fixed effects  Pooled OLS Fixed effects  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
ROE -13.354* -1.335* -10.236* -1.012* -0.454* -0.163* -0.286* -0.163* 
  (-5.73) (-2.95) (-2.69) (-2.29) (-5.10) (-2.71) (-1.97) (-2.68) 
ROA 0.139 -0.729* -0.108 -0.654* 0.0252* 0.072 0.017 0.007 
  (1.07) (-2.52) (-0.43) (-2.32) (3.29) (1.80) (1.39) (1.81) 
NITI -0.040* -0.492* 0.004 -0.804* 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.044 
 (-4.58)  (-2.39)  (0.44) (-3.97) (0.93) (0.79) (-0.2) (0.84) 
CAR -0.356* -1.280* -0.157* -1.266* -0.003* -0.027* -0.001 -0.027* 
  (-12.71) (-10.30) (-3.65) (-10.5) (-4.66) (-1.93) (-0.34) (-1.91) 
LR 0.039* 0.070* 0.024 0.096* 0.007* -0.039 0.001 -0.040* 
  (2.06) (2.29) (0.99) (3.10) (4.80) (-2.39) (0.34) (-2.36) 
TAlog -0.244 0.048 0.370 -0.013 0.031* 0.078* 0.019 0.078 
  (-1.85) (2.34) (1.33) (-0.41) (6.38) (4.91) (1.71) (4.81) 
REG -2.833 -0.449 7.452* -0.587* -0.002 0.027 -0.053 0.019 
  (-1.75) (-1.82) (4.66) (-2.45) (-0.95) (0.40) (-1.75) (0.27) 
GOV -3.239* -0.078 0.000 0.058 -0.082* -0.072 0.000 -0.075 
  (-3.09) (-0.49) (0.00) (0.37) (-3.02) (-1.37) (0.00) (-1.43) 
_cons 12.173 1.793 -6.610 3.874 0.262 1.035 0.526 1.040 
  (4.36) (1.08) (-1.77) (2.39) (3.12) (2.73) (3.16) (2.72) 
Obs 2476 2476 2476 2476 612 612 612 612 
Banks 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
F test  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-sq  0.1905 0.1299 0.1293 0.1266 0.1716 0.0582 0.1036 0.072 
Source: BankScope and own calculations. * denotes statistical significance p - values below <0.05  
In parentheses, we show the t –statistics. The 2006-2014 year dummies coefficients in Models 1 & 2 are omitted 
since they are not relevant for our analysis. 
 
